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Hear Me Roar: What Provokes Supreme 
Court Justices to Dissent from the Bench? 
Timothy R. Johnson† 
Ryan C. Black‡ 
Eve M. Ringsmuth†‡ 
Before the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1988 Term Justice Harry 
Blackmun was asked whether he believed Roe v. Wade1 would 
be overturned. His outlook for the future of Roe was pessimis-
tic: “The next question is, ‘[w]ill Roe v. Wade go down the 
drain?’ . . . I think there’s a very distinct possibility that it will, 
this term. You can count the votes.”2 When the Court added 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services3 to its docket Black-
mun’s prediction seemed prescient. He was only partially right, 
however; while the Court used Webster to enhance states’ abili-
ty to restrict abortions, it did not overrule Roe.4 
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 1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 2. Associated Press, Justice Fears for Roe Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 
1988, at A24. 
 3. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 4. Id. at 491–523. 
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Certainly, Justice Blackmun was relieved that Roe sur-
vived another day, but the Court’s decision still troubled him 
enough that he authored a dissenting opinion.5 To make his 
reservations clear, when the Court’s decision was announced on 
July 3, 1989, Blackmun took the relatively extraordinary step 
of announcing an emotional dissent from the bench.6 For ten 
minutes he spoke in a tone described as “grave, angry, and dis-
tressed.”7 Linda Greenhouse, the Supreme Court correspondent 
for the New York Times, wrote the next day that Blackmun’s 
tone was “weary and sorrowful.”8 This is perhaps because he 
did not go into this dissent lightly. Rather, Blackmun seems to 
have agonized over the perfect wording. Figure 1 depicts the 
draft of his final three sentences—perhaps the most famous 
words spoken in a dissent from the bench in the past twenty-
five years.9 
 
Figure 1: Blackmun’s Draft Dissent in Webster. 
 
 
 5. Id. at 537 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 6. Id. at 490; EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 418–19 (1998). 
 7. LAZARUS, supra note 6, at 418.  
 8. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court, 5-4, Narrowing Roe v. Wade, 
Upholds Sharp State Limits on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1989, at A1. 
 9. Harry Blackmun, Insert C (date unknown) (unpublished draft dissent 
to Roe v. Wade, on file with the Library of Congress) (Figure 1).  
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There are two notable features of Blackmun’s conclusions. 
First, he added the word “for” at the beginning of the first two 
sentences to emphasize that, in his eyes, Roe’s days were clear-
ly numbered. Second, he indicated the precedent’s demise 
would be harsh, and he looked for the right words to make his 
point. Originally he typed, “Oh, but an icy wind blows.”10 How-
ever, he inserted changes below the text that were ultimately 
what he proclaimed: “But the signs are evident and very omin-
ous, and a chill wind blows.”11 As he gave this dissent from the 
bench Blackmun certainly appears to have been cognizant that 
his words would have a clear effect on the public’s view of Web-
ster. As such, his dismay was publicly evident.  
Using Blackmun’s behavior as a launching point, this Ar-
ticle argues he read his dissent because of his ideological dis-
cord with the majority, because of the legal and policy salience 
of the Court’s decision, and because of his concern that Roe 
would soon be overturned. The question is whether Blackmun’s 
behavior was specific to Webster or whether there is something 
systematic about his behavior across Justices, across Courts, 
and across time. In other words, are there empirical regulari-
ties to the conditions under which Justices will announce their 
separate opinions from the bench or, alternatively, is it simply 
a random phenomenon?  
The answer, laid out in the remainder of this Article, is 
that important and theoretically motivated patterns exist to 
explain Justices’ decisions to announce separate opinions from 
the bench. The empirical results demonstrate the decision to 
announce is a function of ideological, case-specific, and poten-
tially strategic considerations. The remainder of this Article 
proceeds as follows. Part I explores additional examples of pub-
licly read dissents. Part II puts forth the theoretical argument 
and provides hypotheses based on this argument. Part III de-
scribes the data used to test these hypotheses, and Part IV 
presents the results of this analysis. This Article concludes 
with a discussion of whether announcing dissents from the 
bench can have an effect on legal policy and what these find-
 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. At least one citizen was unhappy with Blackmun’s public argu-
ment. Indeed, on July 6, 1989, Gerald Foley wrote to the Justice. His letter 
was one sentence long: “Mr. Justice Blackmun: Concentrate on rendering deci-
sions and leave the weather reports to the meteorologists. Thank You.” To 
this, Blackmun wrote on the bottom of the note, “a chill wind blows!” Letter 
from Gerald Foley to Harry Blackmun, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court 
(July 7, 1989) (on file with the Library of Congress and with the author). 
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ings mean for our understanding of Supreme Court decision 
making and the Justices’ relationships with one another. 
I.  READING SEPARATE OPINIONS FROM THE BENCH   
Justice Blackmun’s public dissent in Webster is certainly 
interesting but is not unique; many other examples—some 
tempered, some terse, some extremely long, and some that pull 
no punches—demonstrate the importance of this behavior. This 
Part discusses some of the most famous of these phenomena 
from the twentieth century. 
When he took over the Chief Justiceship in 2005 John Ro-
berts hoped to achieve some measure of collegiality on a Court 
that had become increasingly divided since 2000.12 Initially, the 
Justices’ propensity for consensus suggested Roberts might 
have been successful.13 Towards the end of the 2005 Term and 
into the start of the 2006 Term, however, his hopes began to 
unravel.14 In fact, more than one-third of all cases decided dur-
ing the 2006 Term came down to a 5-4 vote—a modern record.15 
The reading of dissents from the bench demonstrates dishar-
mony on the Court—at least over the outcome of specific cases. 
In fact, the liberal wing of the Roberts Court appeared to be-
come increasingly upset with their colleagues’ decisions. As 
such, each Justice in this typical voting bloc read dissents from 
the bench during the 2006 Term.16 
In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,17 Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg announced her dissent from the bench, the 
second time in two months she took such a tack in cases involv-
ing women’s rights.18 While it was clear that the actions of her 
 
 12. Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, THE ATLANTIC, Jan.–Feb. 2007, at 104, 
105. 
 13. Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Dissent Reveals Strain Beneath Court’s 
Placid Surface, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2006, at A1. 
 14. See id.; Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Is at Court’s Helm, but He Isn’t Yet 
in Control, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2006, at A1. 
 15. See Anthony Lewis, The Court: How ‘So Few Have So Quickly 
Changed So Much,’ N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 20, 2007, at 58, 58. 
 16. Editorial, A Disappointing Term: President Bush’s Nominees Give the 
Supreme Court an Activist Nudge to the Right, WASH. POST, July 3, 2007, at 
A14. 
 17. 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007). 
 18. See Linda Greenhouse, Oral Dissents Give Ginsburg a New Voice, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A1. Ginsburg’s dissent was approximately seven mi-
nutes long. She began by strongly admonishing the majority coalition for its 
decision: “In our view the Court does not comprehend or is indifferent to the 
insidious way in which women can be victims of pay discrimination.” Audio 
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colleagues angered Ginsburg, Robert Barnes writes that, 
“Ginsburg’s voice was as precise and emotionless as if she were 
reading a banking decision, but the words were stinging.”19 In 
this public argument, she explicitly asked Congress to, “correct 
this Court’s parsimonious reading of Title VII.”20 Justice Gins-
burg announced an equally angry dissent in Gonzales v. Car-
hart.21  
Richard Lazarus argues that announcing a dissent from 
the bench is significant for a Justice; as he puts it, “[i]t’s a dif-
ferent order of magnitude of dissent.”22 For Justice Ginsburg, 
Lazarus suggests her dissents “may be signifying an increasing 
frustration [with the Court’s decisions].”23 One other notable 
announced dissent from the liberal side of the Court came in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dis-
trict No. 1.24 In open court Justice Breyer argued that, “[i]t is 
not often in the law that so few have so quickly changed so 
much.”25 Like Ginsburg’s dissents, Breyer’s indicates a clear 
dissatisfaction with the direction of the Court’s legal policy 
choices. 
The reading of dissents from the bench on the Roberts 
Court is not relegated to the moderate or liberal Justices, how-
ever. Indeed, during the 2005 Term Justices Antonin Scalia 
and Clarence Thomas read angry dissents in Hamdan v. Rums-
feld.26 As Tony Mauro and Jason McLure point out, “[f]or 30 
minutes, spectators in the Court chamber saw a dramatic dis-
play of tensions between the moderate and conservative wings 
 
recording: Opinion Announcement in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co., Inc. (May 29, 2007), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/ 
2006/2006_05_1074/opinion/, at 4:00 min. 
 19. Robert Barnes, Over Ginsburg’s Dissent, Court Limits Bias Suits, 
WASH. POST, May 30, 2007, at A1. 
 20. Audio recording, supra note 18, at 10:52 min. 
 21. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); Audio recording: Opinion Announcement in 
Gonzalez v. Carhart (Apr. 18, 2007), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/ 
2000-2009/2006/2006_05_380/opinion/, at 7:27 min. 
 22. Barnes, supra note 19. 
 23. Id. 
 24. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).  
 25. Audio recording: Opinion Announcement in Parents Involved in Cmty. 
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (June 28, 2007), available at http://www 
.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_908/opinion/, at 32:53 min. 
 26. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), superseded by statute, Military Commissions 
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, as recognized in Boumediene 
v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).   
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of the Court.”27 Justice Thomas’s dissent began by noting that 
he had never before taken such a tack: “In 15 terms on this 
Court, I have never read a dissent from the Bench; but today’s 
requires that I do so.”28 When it was Scalia’s turn, he made an 
equally impassioned argument and closed by stating, “I vigo-
rously dissent.”29 
One year before Hamdan, Justice Scalia was equally caus-
tic in his announced Roper v. Simmons dissent.30 Specifically, 
he was angry when the Court ruled that the death penalty for 
those who committed murder while under eighteen years of age 
was cruel and unusual punishment.31 As Jan Crawford Green-
 
 27. Tony Mauro & Jason McLure, Top Court Invalidates Gitmo Tribunals, 
N.J. L.J., July 3, 2006, at 11, 11. 
 28. Audio recording: Opinion Announcement in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
(June 29, 2006), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_ 
05_184/opinion/, at 24:26 min. Thomas continued:  
  A mere ten days ago, each member of today’s plurality deferred to 
the Army Corps of Engineers’ highly questionable determination that 
storm drains, roadside ditches, and desert washes are navigable wa-
ters or, rather, waters of the United States. Today, when there is 
much more at stake than ephemeral pools of water, the plurality and 
the Court repeatedly refuse to defer to the wartime judgment of the 
President himself. The Court's determination that it is qualified to 
pass on the military necessity of the Commander in Chief ’s decision 
to employ a particular form of force against our enemies is unprece-
dented, and it is unsupported by any authoritative source of law, and 
is specifically refuted by every relevant historical example. According-
ly, I respectfully dissent.  
Id. at 24:36 min. 
 29. As Scalia put it: 
  Our past practice has always been to err on the side of caution 
and deference to the Executive in cases involving the prosecution of 
warfare and judgments about the appropriate use of military power, 
including the power to try enemy captives. Today, that edifice of cau-
tion and deference comes crashing down. The Court takes on a new 
role as active manager of the details of military conflicts. We bring 
neither lawful jurisdiction nor competence to the performance of this 
role. For all these reasons, I vigorously dissent.  
Id. at 28:33 min. 
 30. 543 U.S. 551, 607 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 31. Justice Scalia’s announcement began angrily:  
  Today the Court announces that the meaning of the Constitution 
has changed in the fifteen years since we decided [Stanford v. Ken-
tucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)], which held that the Eighth Amendment 
does not prohibit capital punishment for offenders who committed 
crimes after the age of sixteen but under the age of eighteen. The 
Court holds, mind you, not that our decision fifteen years ago was 
wrong, but that our Constitution’s meaning has changed. It reaches 
this implausible result by purporting to advert to [‘]the evolving stan-
dards of decency[’] of our national society. It finds that a national con-
sensus that could not be perceived in our people’s laws barely fifteen 
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burg noted, “Justice Scalia again forcefully and in quite harsh 
language at times [said] that Justice Kennedy was making a 
mockery of the Constitution, ignoring the wishes of the citizens 
of the United States, and paying attention to the views of fo-
reigners.”32 
Certainly the Roberts Court has had its share of fireworks 
when the Justices announce opinions, dissents, and concur-
rences in open Court. But other Courts, even those without the 
ideological divisions of the recent years, have had equally in-
teresting announcement days. Indeed, while Epstein et al. 
demonstrate that, prior to roughly 1940, there was a norm by 
which Justices did not publicly dissent either orally or in writ-
ing, such public displays occurred on occasion.33 For instance, 
when the Court upheld a decision by President Franklin Roose-
velt taking the country off the gold standard, Justice McRey-
nolds declared from the bench that, “[t]he Constitution, as we 
have known it, is gone.”34 Two years later McReynolds fired 
another oral salvo when the Court upheld the social security 
unemployment tax; specifically, he argued that the union of 
states was being “destroyed.”35 
Even after the practice of reading public dissents was 
strongly discouraged by Chief Justice Burger, some Justices, 
like Potter Stewart, continued the practice when deemed ap-
propriate.36 In his tribute to Justice Stewart, Laurence Tribe 
 
years ago now solidly exists. That is so, the Court says, because since 
Stanford, four states have changed their laws to forbid execution of 
under-eighteen offenders. Justice Kennedy said five states, one of 
those five did not change its laws, a court changed the laws, a court 
held that it was unconstitutional, in other words, if there is any 
change in consensus it is the consensus of judges not of the people. 
One wonders whether those four states would even have changed 
their laws had they known that this Court, by a stroke of a pen, would 
make the change irrevocable.  
Audio recording: Opinion Announcement in Roper v. Simmons (Mar. 1, 
2005), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_ 
633/opinion/, at 9:49 min. 
 32. NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Juvenile Death Penalty (PBS television 
broadcast Mar. 1, 2005), transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/ 
bb/law/jan-june05/juvenile_3-1.html. 
 33. See Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 362, 362–63 (2001). 
 34. See Proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in Memory 
of Mr. Justice McReynolds (Mar. 31, 1948), in 334 U.S. v, x (1948). 
 35. See M’Reynolds Dies; Court Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1946, at 
23. 
 36. See Laurence H. Tribe, Justice Stewart: A Tale of Two Portraits, 95 
YALE L.J. 1328, 1331 (1986). 
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argues that “[his] firm conviction that the republic deserves an 
explanation of where its Supreme Court Justices stand on an 
issue—and why— manifested itself in his policy of reading his 
dissents from the bench.”37 Additional evidence of Stewart’s up-
front approach in highly salient cases include his majority opi-
nion in Katz v. United States38 (prior to the Burger Court) and 
his concurrence in Furman v. Georgia39 (during the Burger 
Court) in which the Justice’s avoidance of “turgid prose” was on 
full display.40 
Finally, timing affects opinion announcements as well. 
Figure 2 shows a memorandum in which Justice Blackmun’s 
clerk suggested that announcing his dissent in Bowers v. 
Hardwick41 on a Friday was a bad idea because it would be ig-
nored during the weekend-long news cycle.42 Thus, she advised 
him to push for the announcement to come down on the follow-
ing Monday.43 The Chief Justice agreed to Justice Blackmun’s 
request.44  
 
 37. Id. 
 38. 389 U.S. 347, 347–51 (1967) (“For the Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places.”). 
 39. 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“These death sen-
tences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is 
cruel and unusual.”). 
 40. Tribe, supra note 36. 
 41. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 42. Memorandum from Pamela Karlan, Law Clerk, to Harry Blackmun, 
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (June 24, 1986) (on file with the Library of 
Congress) (Figure 2). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186 (noting that the case was decided on 
Monday, June 30, 1986). Although focusing on the timing of announcements 
may stem from political astuteness, reading a dissent from the bench can come 
at bad times as well—sometimes in very tragic ways. Indeed, former Chief 
Justice Rehnquist points out that on April 22, 1946, while announcing a dis-
sent from the bench, Chief Justice Stone pitched forward, felled by a stroke, 
and died later that night. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the U.S. Su-
preme Court, Remarks at Duke University School of Law, as part of the My 
Life in the Law Series (Apr. 13, 2002), available at http://www.supremecourtus 
.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-13-02.html. 
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Figure 2: Memo Concerning Timing of Opinion Announcement in Bowers. 
II.  WHAT EXPLAINS ANNOUNCED DISSENTS  
FROM THE BENCH?   
The Introduction and the previous Part indicate that Jus-
tices can and do announce separate opinions from the bench—
even when Court norms suggest taking such action should be 
rare. Why would Justices ever take such a tack? Because scho-
lars have not written specifically on the decision to orally dis-
sent, this Article turns to analyses of other behaviors for clues 
as to why they would engage in this behavior. This Part consid-
ers the most relevant of this small but rich literature, with a 
clear focus on dissenting behavior more generally. 
Announcing a dissent or concurrence orally is not the only 
means by which Justices can “go public” when they are dissa-
tisfied with decisions their colleagues make (at any stage of the 
decision-making process). For example, when a Justice pub-
lishes a dissent from the denial of certiorari, she publicly ex-
presses her disapproval of the Court’s decision not to review a 
case—an action that is not taken lightly.45 These dissents may 
play two separate, but equally important roles. First, they pro-
vide an avenue through which a Justice may communicate with 
external actors.46 Indeed, Justices may wish to comment on a 
lower court’s decision or to relay information to litigants re-
garding strategies for getting similar cases accepted in the fu-
ture. Second, a dissent from denial may be part of the Court’s 
 
 45. See Tribe, supra note 36, at 1330–31. 
 46. Lee Epstein et al., Discerning the Goals of U.S. Supreme Court Justic-
es (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
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internal bargaining process.47 That is, a Justice may use such a 
dissent to indicate her resolve on a matter or to boost the credi-
bility of future threats to go public. Regardless of the intended 
audience, going public through dissents from denial of certiora-
ri serves key purposes for the Justices. At the same time, how-
ever, doing so also breaks a norm of behavior on the Court.48 
A particularly poignant example is that sometimes Justices 
even threaten to publicly discuss internal Court procedures 
with which they disagree. Justice Douglas’s reaction to Chief 
Justice Burger’s request for reargument in Roe v. Wade illu-
strates this point.49 When Burger asked for this course of ac-
tion, Douglas was incensed and threatened to make public a 
dissent that told “what is happening to us and the tragedy it 
entails.”50 He was particularly upset because the Court had a 
majority and he believed the Chief wanted to hear rearguments 
in part to procure the votes of Justices Powell and Rehnquist—
the two newest members of the Court.51 Thus, Douglas felt the 
Chief ’s plan “dilute[d] the integrity of the Court and ma[de] the 
decisions here depend on the manipulative skills of [the] Chief 
Justice.”52 Ultimately, we believe announcing opinions from the 
bench is similar to Justice Douglas’s behavior in Roe and to the 
decision to dissent from denial of certiorari. That is, each beha-
vior breaks a collegial norm on the Court, and is therefore not 
taken lightly by the Justices choosing such a course of action.  
The remainder of this Part focuses on the literature on dis-
senting behavior to provide us with insight into announced opi-
nions; these insights are presented as a series of hypotheses.  
Scholars provide three primary explanations for this beha-
vior: ideological affinity, strategic factors, and institutional con-
text.53 First, and most fundamentally, the decision to dissent or 
concur stems from a disagreement over law and policy prefe-
rences.54 This may be because a Justice is unhappy with the 
precedent set in a case, or because she believes existing legal 
 
 47. Id.  
 48. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 59 (1998). 
 49. LAZARUS, supra note 6, at 354. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. For a discussion of when the Court is likely to hear rearguments, 
see Valerie Hoekstra & Timothy Johnson, Delaying Justice: The Supreme 
Court’s Decision to Hear Rearguments, 56 POL. RES. Q. 351, 353–57 (2003). 
 53. E.g., Paul J. Wahlbeck et al., The Politics of Dissents and Concur-
rences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 27 AM. POL. Q. 488, 494 (1999).  
 54. Id. at 494–95. 
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doctrine is being compromised by the majority’s policy choice. 
Therefore, as Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzman argue, a Jus-
tice is more likely to write separately when she is ideologically 
distant from her colleagues. Furthermore, the likelihood of 
ideological disagreement is increased by cases that deal with 
multiple issues.55  
Second, Wahlbeck et al. argue that the decision to write a 
separate opinion is not simply a function of policy preferences.56 
Rather, the decision may include a variety of strategic consid-
erations.57 For instance, Justices must consider how the impli-
cations of their actions will affect long-term relationships with 
their colleagues because the decision to write separately is af-
fected by the collegial norms of the Court as well as by the rela-
tionship between each Justice and the majority opinion au-
thor.58 In addition to considerations of collegiality, the size of 
the majority coalition may influence the decision to write sepa-
rately.59 The strength of the majority’s coalition is related to its 
size, and as such, a “minimum winning” coalition may be more 
vulnerable to attack by members of the minority. Finally, sepa-
rate opinions are more likely in highly salient cases because, in 
these cases, Justices are less likely to sweep disagreements un-
der the rug in the name of consensus or collegiality.60  
Beyond Justices’ relationship with one another, they may 
consider the reactions of external actors when deciding to read 
a dissent from the bench. To support this argument, we draw 
on Hausegger and Baum’s investigation of when Justices are 
likely to offer invitations to Congress to override the Court’s 
decision by passing new legislation.61 They find that such invi-
 
 55. Id. at 495. 
 56. Id. at 496, 498. 
 57. Id. at 496–98. For a discussion of strategic choices more generally, see 
EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 48, at 56–98 (discussing whether Justices act 
strategically to advance their legal interpretations); FORREST MALTZMAN ET 
AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 62–72 
(2000) (discussing the strategic methods that Justices use to influence their 
colleagues during the opinion-drafting process); WALTER F. MURPHY, ELE-
MENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 198–210 (1964) (discussing how a Justice may 
use his power to further his policy objectives in the context of legal and politi-
cal limitations). See generally Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Integrated 
Models of Judicial Dissent, 55 J. POL. 914 (1993) (discussing the impact that 
institutional rules and structures have on judicial voting). 
 58. See Wahlbeck et al., supra note 53, at 496. 
 59. Id. at 497. 
 60. See id. at 496–97. 
 61. See Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Inviting Congressional Action: 
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tations may be more likely to occur in areas of minimal interest 
to the Justices and in cases in which many amicus curiae briefs 
were filed on the losing side.62 Their model focuses on invita-
tions found in majority opinions; however, the effect of salience 
may also operate in the opposite way. More specifically, Haus-
seger and Baum’s argument hinges on the fact that Justices 
signing onto the majority opinion are requesting Congress to 
take action on a decision with which they disagree.63 An issue 
need not be of minimal interest when the minority expresses a 
desire for congressional assistance in overturning the Court’s 
decision because the minority Justices are actually requesting 
Congress to overturn the decision made by the majority.  
Beyond policy preferences and strategy, Justices’ decisions 
may also be shaped by institutional factors such as holding the 
Chief Justiceship, being a new member of the Court, and work-
load considerations.64 In other words, the institutional setting 
in which Justices operate may encourage or discourage the 
writing of a separate opinion. For example, while acclimating 
themselves to their roles as Supreme Court Justices, new Jus-
tices may be less likely to author separate opinions than would 
their more experienced counterparts.65 
Ultimately, significant insight into why Justices may want 
to announce a decision orally may be gleaned from their deci-
sion to dissent generally, and from the relationship between the 
Court and external actors. These insights lead us to several 
specific hypotheses that focus on both the Court’s internal and 
external context. The Court’s internal dynamics are an impor-
tant starting point to determine the effect that ideology plays in 
a Justice’s decision to dissent from the bench. Given that we 
know Justices are more likely to issue a written dissent when 
they are ideologically distant from the majority opinion writ-
er,66 Justices will also likely be influenced in the same way 
when deciding whether to read the dissent in open court. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
A Study of Supreme Court Motivations in Statutory Interpretation, 43 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 162, 167–70 (1999). 
 62. Id. at 178–79. 
 63. See id. at 168. 
 64. See Brace & Hall, supra note 57, at 918–19; Wahlbeck et al., supra 
note 53, at 498–99. 
 65. Wahlbeck et al., supra note 53, at 498. 
 66. Id. at 495; see also Charles Cameron et al., Shaping Supreme Court 
Policy Through Appointments: The Impact of a New Justice, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
1820, 1834 (2009).  
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Ideological Distance Hypothesis: The greater the ideological 
distance between a Justice and the majority opinion author, the 
more likely a Justice will announce a dissent from the bench.67 
It is also known in the literature that Justices are less like-
ly to write separately if they have cooperated more often with 
the majority opinion writer in the past.68 This dynamic is also 
likely involved in the decision to dissent from the bench. Specif-
ically, Justices who have joined more opinions with the majori-
ty opinion author are less likely to publicly rebuke the policy 
decision announced by the Court in the current case.69 This dy-
namic yields our second hypothesis: 
Collegiality Hypothesis: A dissenting Justice is less likely 
to publicly announce a dissent if she has cooperated with the 
majority opinion author more often in the past. 
Next, when a case is particularly salient, the Justices’ 
views are more intensely held, which means that they are more 
likely to hold fast to their policy positions stated at confe-
rence.70 As such, it is intuitive that Justices would be more 
willing to air their differences in open court rather than simply 
in written form. Thus, it is expected that: 
Salient Case Hypothesis: Justices are more likely to an-
nounce dissents from the bench in politically and legally salient 
cases. 
The salience of a case may also be measured by how closely 
divided the Justices are over the outcome of a case. Such divi-
sions indicate a clear-cut disagreement over the policy set by 
the majority.71 In other words, a Justice may be more upset 
about a majority decision in these cases than when the Justices 
reach a unanimous or near unanimous decision. This leads to 
the hypothesis that: 
Minimum Winning Coalition Hypothesis: A Justice is more 
likely to announce a dissent from the bench when the majority 
coalition is minimum winning, as in a 5-4 decision. 
Beyond factors internal to the Court, external forces may 
influence the decision to announce from the bench. Indeed, 
 
 67. Wahlbeck et al., supra note 53, at 495.   
 68. Id. at 496, 500, 502–03. 
 69. See id. at 496, 507. Wahlbeck and his colleagues specifically argue 
that the more often the present majority-opinion writer has cooperated with a 
Justice in the past, the less likely the Justice will author a separate opinion in 
the present case. Id. at 502–03, 507. 
 70. See id. at 496–97. 
 71. See id. at 497, 503. 
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Hausseger and Baum argue that Justices may sometimes try to 
send signals to the elected branches about changing decisions 
with which they disagree.72 We utilize this intuition and argue 
that Justices dissatisfied with a decision may announce a dis-
sent in open court as a strong signal that Congress should alter 
the majority opinion. In particular, we hypothesize that: 
Distance from Congress Hypothesis: The closer ideologically 
a Justice is to each house of Congress, the more likely he will 
read a dissent or concurrence from the bench. 
III.  DATA AND METHODS   
To test our hypotheses, we use a newly constructed dataset 
consisting of all cases that had, as of August 2007, an opinion 
announcement audio file available on the Oyez website.73 These 
announcement files, 1291 in total, cover cases decided between 
1975 and 2006. There are some gaps and periods of under-
coverage in the data. For example, between 1975 and 1984 data 
are available for only twenty of the Court’s opinions. For cases 
decided in the last fifteen or so Terms, the data are more com-
plete. Of the 501 orally argued, signed opinions or judgments of 
the Court released from 2000 to 2006, there are announcement 
files for all but seven (or about ninety-nine percent of all cas-
es).74  
Because this Article focuses on modeling the decision of 
each separate opinion author to announce his or her opinion in 
open court, the unit of analysis is the separate opinion (exclud-
ing all non-unanimous cases). Across the 684 unique, non-
unanimously decided cases, we observe a total of 1078 separate 
opinions, forty of which (3.7 percent) were orally announced. 
The dependent variable is coded 1 if a Justice announces either 
a dissent or a concurrence in open court and 0 otherwise. Be-
cause this variable is dichotomous, the model invokes a logistic 
regression with robust standard errors.75 
 
 72. See Hausegger & Baum, supra note 61, at 168. 
 73. For these announcements and many other resources, navigate 
Oyez.com: U.S. Supreme Court Case Summaries, Oral Arguments & Multime-
dia, http://www.oyez.org/ (last visited April 14, 2009). 
 74. We are currently in the process of systematically examining what, if 
any, biases exist in the sampling of cases that we have. Ultimately, however, 
we are describing the population of currently available data. As more audio 
files are made available, we plan to include them in our dataset. 
 75. We do not distinguish between concurrences and dissents. Of the sep-
arate announced decisions, however, only six of them are concurrences. Our 
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The model includes a series of independent variables. First, 
Majority Opinion Writer Distance measures the ideological dis-
tance between the majority opinion writer and the Justice who 
writes separately in a case. We use the Judicial Common Space 
(JCS)76 scores and calculate the absolute value of the difference 
between the two Justices. This variable ranges from 0.0009 to 
1.36 with a standard deviation of 0.378. 
We also include a variable to test for whether Justices who 
are more collegial with the majority opinion author are less 
likely to read from the bench. To capture this concept we follow 
Wahlbeck et al.77 and include Collegial Relationship, measured 
as the percent of the time in the previous Term the separate 
opinion author joined a concurring or dissenting opinion writ-
ten by the majority author in the current case. This variable 
ranges from 0 to 92.85 with a mean of 9.36. 
To tap Case Salience, we include three variables. First, we 
measure the Legal Salience of a case with a categorical variable 
measured as 1 if a case formally alters precedent or declares an 
act of Congress unconstitutional, and 0 otherwise.78 This varia-
ble takes on a value of 1 in approximately 10 percent of our ob-
servations. 
Additionally, borrowing from social psychology literature, 
Black and Johnson suggest that the more salient a case is to 
the Justices, the more active they will be at oral arguments.79 
Thus, to measure the degree to which individual Justices find a 
case salient, we include the number of questions asked by the 
Court during the case’s oral argument session. Number of 
Oral Argument Questions has a mean of 128 and a standard 
deviation of roughly forty-two questions. 
Beyond these factors that focus on case salience, Hoekstra 
and Johnson argue a proxy for case controversy is whether the 
 
results do not change substantively if we omit them from the model. Thus, our 
analysis largely focuses on the concept of dissenting from the bench. 
 76. See Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 303, 306–07 (2007). 
 77. See Wahlbeck et al., supra note 53, at 500. The only difference be-
tween their measure and ours is that we do not purge this variable of “ideolog-
ical compatibility.” Id. 
 78. This follows common practice in the literature. See, e.g., MALTZMAN ET 
AL., supra note 57, at 46. 
 79. Ryan C. Black & Timothy R. Johnson, Judicial Politics and the Search 
for the Holy Grail (of Salience) 10–11 (Jan. 4, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/ 
2/1/2/4/6/pages212460/p212460-1.php. 
 2009] DISSENTS FROM THE BENCH 1575 
 
final merits vote was decided by a single vote.80 Accordingly, we 
code Minimum Winning Vote as 1 for all cases with a minimum 
winning coalition (for example, 5-4), and 0 for all other cases 
(for example, 7-2). In our sample, thirty-nine percent of the ob-
servations are coded as 1. 
To test the two congressional hypotheses, we return to the 
JCS scores and compute the absolute value of the distance be-
tween the dissenting/concurring Justice and the median mem-
ber of the Senate (Senate Median Distance) or the House 
(House Median Distance). As we note above, we expect both va-
riables to be negatively related to public announcements. That 
is, when the Justice announcing hopes to be helped by Con-
gress, she will make a public plea for the legislature to act. 
Finally, we include three control variables that provide ad-
ditional explanations for why Justices may announce dissents 
or concurrences from the bench. We code Issue Expertise as the 
number of separate opinions in a given value area written by a 
Justice since joining the Court, divided by the total number of 
cases from that value area that have come before the Court.81 
We also include Freshman Separate Writer, which is coded 1 if 
the Justice writing the separate opinion has not yet served two 
full terms on the bench.82 Finally, Multiple Legal Provisions 
comes directly from Professor Harold Spaeth and is coded as 1 
when an opinion deals with more than one legal provision.  
IV.  RESULTS   
We report the parameter estimates for our model in Table 
1. Overall, the model performs relatively well and provides an 
interesting glimpse of why Justices would take the unusual 






 80. Hoekstra & Johnson, supra note 52, at 354, 356. 
 81. To operationalize this variable, we take an approach similar to 
MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 57, at 43–44.  
 82. See Wahlbeck et al., supra note 53, at 501. We also sought to control 
for whether a Justice is the Chief. However, in the data no Chief Justice is-
sued a dissent from the bench. Thus, it cannot be included in the model, but it 
is suggestive that the Chief Justice, as leader of the Court, may be even more 
reluctant than Associate Justices to break norms of collegiality. See, e.g., id. at 
507. 
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Variable Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
Distance Between 
Justice and Majori-
ty Opinion Writer 
1.62* .79 
Collegiality Be-













Distance Between Justice 
and Senate Median 
-3.82* 2.02 
Distance Between Justice 
and House Median 
2.99* 1.66 
Expertise of Justice in Is-
sue Area 
-0.00 .01 
Justice is New to the Court 0.03 .80 
Case Complexity -0.28 .49 
Constant -6.42* .86 
N 1078  
Table 1: Logistic Regression Results of a Justice’s Decision to Announce a 
Dissent from the Bench. 
* Denotes p < 0.10 (two-tailed test).  
 
Consistent with our Ideological Distance Hypothesis, the 
data suggest that as the distance between the dissent author 
and the majority opinion author increases, so too does the like-
lihood that the dissenter will orally announce her opinion. The 
substantive magnitude of this result is visually illustrated in 
Figure 3, which portrays the predicted probability of an-
nouncement, conditional on three levels of ideological distance. 
When distance between the dissenting and majority writers is 
at its minimum (in substantive terms the pairing of Justices 
Ginsburg and Breyer in 2006), the predicted probability of an 
announcement is 0.003.83 Moving to the median distance, or in 
substantive terms the pairing of Justices O’Connor and Stevens 
in 2000, the probability of observing an announcement increas-
es to 0.007.84 While still miniscule in overall size, it is a 133 
percent increase in the likelihood (and is statistically signifi-
cant at the 90 percent level). Finally, moving to the maximum 
 
 83. See infra fig.3. 
 84. See infra fig.3. 
 2009] DISSENTS FROM THE BENCH 1577 
 
observed distance (pairing then-Associate Justice Rehnquist 
with Justice Marshall in 1984), the probability of an an-
nouncement grows to 0.02, which is significant even though the 
standard error bars overlap.85 This is still a small probability, 
but given that Justices do not often dissent from the bench, this 
is a large effect. 
 
Figure 3: Effect of Majority Opinion Writer Distance on Probability of An-
nouncement. 
 
The data also lend limited support for the Case Salience 
hypothesis. While the model suggests that all four variables are 
significantly related to a Justice’s decision to announce her dis-
sent—in probing each variable’s substantive significance—only 
Number of Oral Argument Questions, which is displayed in 
Figure 4, and Minimum Winning Vote have substantively mea-
 
 85. See infra fig.3. The difference between the median and maximum is 
not statistically significant, but the difference between the minimum and max-
imum is statistically significant at the ninety percent level. 




Figure 4: Effect of Number of Oral Argument Questions on Probability of An-
nouncement. 
 
Holding all other variables at their median values, a Jus-
tice has only 0.004 probability of announcing her opinion when 
there is relatively little activity at oral arguments.86 For a case 
with an average amount of oral argument activity, the proba-
bility doubles to 0.008.87 This difference is statistically signifi-
cant at the 90 percent level. The move from an average case to 
a case with an above average amount of activity increases the 
probability of announcement to 0.01, but this change is not sta-
tistically distinguishable from either the mean or lower level of 
oral argument activity.88 
In the context of the Minimum Winning Vote variable, the 
 
 86. See supra fig.4. 
 87. See supra fig.4. 
 88. See supra fig.4. 
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substantive results are stronger. Here, a Justice announces 
with a probability of only 0.007 when the decision is not a min-
imum-winning one.89 In its minimum-winning counterpart, 
however, a Justice will announce with a probability of 0.03—
more than a three-fold increase that is statistically significant 
at the 90 percent level.90 
Our model provides interesting yet mixed results for our 
congressional hypotheses. Recall that we hypothesize that as 
the distance between a Justice and the chamber median de-
creases, the Justice should be more likely to announce her sep-
arate opinion from the bench. The negative and statistically 
significant coefficient on the Senate Median Distance variable 
supports this intuition, but, paradoxically, the finding for the 
House Median Distance variable runs contrary to our predic-
tion. That is, while closeness increases the probability a Justice 
announces her dissent when looking at the Senate median, 
closeness decreases the probability that the same Justice an-
nounces when looking at the House median. Certainly, this is 
not a fully satisfying result for us, but it is consistent with ex-
tant work that demonstrates that Justices are more likely to be 
influenced by their ideological relationship with the Senate 
than with the House.91 
Finally, we do not find support for our Collegial Relation-
ship variable,92 or any of the remaining control variables: Mul-
tiple Legal Provisions, Freshman Separate Writer, and Issue 
Expertise.  
  CONCLUSION   
Clearly, Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court do not an-
nounce separate opinions from the bench often. However, they 
do so under certain conditions. When a Justice is ideologically 
 
 89. See supra fig.4. 
 90. See supra fig.4. 
 91. Timothy R. Johnson, The Supreme Court, the Solicitor General, and 
the Separation of Powers, 31 AM. POL. RES. 426, 438 (2003).  
 92. One might speculate that we have collinearity between our Collegial 
Relationship and Majority Opinion Writer Distance variables. There is a me-
dium-sized negative relationship between the two variables (p = -0.51), but 
reestimating the model excluding Collegial Relationship does not affect our 
inferences about Majority Opinion Writer Distance (p = 0.10), nor does esti-
mating the model without Majority Opinion Writer Distance alter our infe-
rence about Collegial Relationship (p = 0.72). We retain both variables, as this 
model specification makes the most sense both theoretically and statistically 
(by the Bayesian Information Criterion). 
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distant from the majority opinion writer, she is more likely to 
issue a dissent in open court. In addition, when their ideologi-
cal predilections are more strongly held (in salient cases), they 
are more likely to speak out about a decision with which they 
disagree. Finally, a Justice’s relationship with Congress affects 
whether she will act in this manner. We believe these findings 
tell us a good deal about how Justices interact with one another 
and with their political context.  
We also know that Justices who announce dissents use 
tones that are also less pleasant and sadder than Justices who 
announce majority opinions from the bench. This is an intuitive 
finding, and is consistent with behavior exhibited by Justices 
Blackmun, Scalia, and others. Indeed, when a Justice is partic-
ularly unhappy with what his colleagues in the majority have 
done, and when a case is salient to that dissenting Justice, the 
level of vitriol should rise. 
The final question, however, is to what end Justices an-
nounce their dissents. Do they do so only to blow off steam, or 
do they have another agenda? Hausseger and Baum demon-
strate conditions under which majority coalitions will ask Con-
gress to overturn a decision.93 However, they do not show evi-
dence of whether Congress reacts to these invitations. While 
our data do not allow us to systematically test this argument 
either, cases in which announced dissents may have led to ac-
tion by Congress do exist.94  
For example, in Employment Division v. Smith the Court 
held that a state law that prohibited the religious use of drugs 
did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment.95 Congress responded with the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act (RFRA) of 1993, which required a compelling gov-
ernment interest for the enactment of laws that substantially 
burdened religious freedom.96 Holding that Congress over-
stepped its enforcement powers under section five of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Court then invalidated the RFRA in 
 
 93. See Hausegger & Baum, supra note 61, at 167–70, 178–79. 
 94. See, e.g., Richard Leiby, A Signature with the First Lady’s Hand in It, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2009, at C1 (explaining how Congress enacted the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act to overrule Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 
127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007)).  
 95. 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (stating that the state statute was a neu-
tral, generally applicable law that did not violate other constitutional protec-
tions), superseded by statute 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. (2000), as recognized 
in United States v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237, 1239 (D. Or. 1996). 
 96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. (2000). 
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City of Boerne v. Flores.97 Congress then tried to fix the RFRA 
through the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act.98 While we cannot draw a direct correlation between this 
new law and her actions, Justice O’Connor announced her dis-
sent in Boerne from the bench. The key to her decision came in 
the conclusion of her five minute announcement: “[i]f the Court 
were to correct the misinterpretation of the Free Exercise 
Clause set forth in Smith, it would simultaneously put our 
First Amendment jurisprudence back on course and would al-
lay the legitimate concerns of a majority in Congress who be-
lieved that Smith improperly restricted religious liberty.”99 Our 
argument is that her public statement had at least something 
to do with why Congress passed such a law. As such, it is no 
wonder that Justices continue to use such a strategy when they 
think they will impact law and policy. 
Our results lead to a more general conclusion: Justices will 
read opinions from the bench when they care a good deal about 
the issue and when they want to change the policy set by the 
majority. That is, they use their dissents to signal litigants and 
other actors (here we test the relationship with Congress) that 
the decision is a bad one and someone must act to change it. 
This is consistent with existing work and also adds to the con-
cept that Justices act in calculated ways when rendering deci-
sions.  
Finally, announcing separate opinions from the bench of-
fers Justices the ability to directly and publicly communicate 
their positions, conveying additional information through the 
manner in which they read these opinions.100 In the end, this 
seems to be a rare, yet integral, part of how Justices decide 
cases and how they interact with one another and those beyond 
the Court.101 
 
 97. See 521 U.S. 507, 511, 516–17 (1997). 
 98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000). 
 99. Audio recording: Opinion Announcement in City of Boerne v. Flores 
(June 25, 1997), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_ 
95_2074/opinion/, at 8:44 min. 
 100. Beyond explaining what factors lead a Justice to issue a dissent in 
Court, we are interested in exploring what goes into such public statements. 
That is, are all dissents as caustic and as morose as Justice Blackmun’s in 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 537 (1989)? See supra 
text accompanying notes 5–10. We plan to investigate this topic in the future. 
 101. We note that our findings about signaling a Justice’s views are consis-
tent with Guinier’s assessment of oral dissents as democracy-enhancing juri-
sprudence or demosprudence. See Lani Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dis-
sent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 47–56 (2008). 
